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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Petitioner appeals from the summary dismissal of his petition for post 
conviction relief where the court did not appoint counsel. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The court succinctly described the underlying criminal case and post 
conviction procedure in its Notice of Intent to Dismiss (hereinafter Notice of 
Intent): 
On July 12, 2008, the jury returned a verdict against Ramiro 
Ramirez and his codefendant Garrett Digiallonardo on the charge 
of Burglary, a felony. The same jury found the codefendants not 
guilty of the charges of aiding/abetting aggravated assault and 
aiding/abetting attempted robbery. The Judgment of Conviction on 
the charge of burglary as to Ramirez was entered on September 8, 
2008. The petitioner filed a timely appeal from the Judgment of 
Conviction. The issue raised in the appeal by trial counsel was the 
trial court's denial of the petitioner's motion for mistrial. The State 
Appellate Public Defender (SAPD) was appointed to represent the 
petitioner on his appeal. The SAPD filed an Amended Notice of 
Appeal. The SAPD also raised on appeal whether the sentence 
imposed was excessive in addition to the denial of the mistrial. 
On April 21, 2011 the Court of Appeals issued its unpublished 
opinion affirming the judgment of conviction. State v. Ramirez, 2011 
Unpublished Opinion No. 447. The Court of Appeals summarized 
the facts of the case as follows: 
At approximately 10:30 p.m. on March 4, 2008, an assistant 
manager at Domino's Pizza in Jerome, Carol Jones, and the 
lone other employee, Jamie Ceja, went behind the building 
for a cigarette break while in the process of closing the 
restaurant for the evening. Jones sat in the driver's seat of 
her vehicle, parked just outside the back door, and Ceja sat 
in the backseat. The back door of the restaurant was open 
and Jones had her windows down. 
After a short time, the women heard a car approach, two 
doors slam, and two men approach the restaurant. The men 
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stopped to pull masks or bandanas over their faces before 
entering the back door. Jones testified that one of the men 
was wearing a gray hooded sweatshirt and was carrying a 
gun and the other was wearing dark clothing. She rolled up 
her car windows and instructed Ceja to call 911. Jones 
watched as the men entered the restaurant. 
The man in the gray sweatshirt went directly to the office. 
The other man went out of sight, but then ran out the back 
door toward the vehicle in which he came, without looking at 
the women. She then stated that the man with the weapon 
exited the building, stopped at the vehicle and she asked 
him, 'What do you want?" He reached for the door handle, 
and Jones told him it was locked. The man said something 
to her, which she could not decipher because it was muffled, 
and then pointed the rifle at her face. Jones started her 
vehicle and began backing it up. The man ran toward his 
vehicle and the perpetrators left, with the women following 
them for a short distance and Ceja describing the incident to 
dispatch. The women returned to the store where they 
discovered that the men had not taken anything, including 
any of the approximately $1,700 cash that was accessible or 
in plain sight at the time: Both employees told police the 
perpetrators were Hispanic, driving a silver Honda, one had 
a shotgun, and both had either bandanas or gorilla masks 
over their faces. 
At approximately 10:47 p.m., an officer stopped a silver two-
door Honda Civic traveling out of Jerome County into Twin 
Falls County. [Garrett] Digiallonardo was the driver and 
Ramiro Ramirez was in the passenger seat. After two 
officers arrived to assist, Digiallonardo and Ramirez were 
pulled from their vehicle at gunpoint, handcuffed, and placed 
in patrol cars. Subsequently, the Domino's employees were 
instructed to drive to the scene, where they viewed the 
men's vehicle and affirmed that while they had not seen their 
faces, Digiallonardo and Ramirez were similar in height and 
build to the men they had seen at Domino's. Jones also 
identified a gray hooded sweatshirt found in the vehicle as 
the same as that worn by one of the perpetrators. 
On April 3, 2012 the petitioner filed a timely petition for post-
conviction relief together with a motion for appointment of counsel. 
The petitioner alleges in his petition that the SAPD was ineffective 
in his representation on appeal in failing to contest the sufficiency of 
the evidence to support the conviction on the charge of burglary. 
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Notice of Intent, p. 1-3. (R. 83-85.) 
In addition to providing its notice of intent to dismiss, the notice also 
denied Petitioner's motion for appointment of counsel: 
Based on the procedural and factual background as set forth herein 
and based on the fact that the petitioner has not made a prima facie 
showing in support of his petition that appellate counsel was 
ineffective, it would appear that the Petition for Post-Conviction 
Relief is frivolous; therefore, the Motion for Appointment of Counsel 
is DENIED without prejudice to the petitioner renewing his motion 
for appointment of counsel as part of any response to this Notice of 
Intent to Dismiss. 
Notice of Intent, p. 7. (R. p. 89.) 
Petitioner filed a reply to the Notice of Intent, but the court ultimately 
dismissed the petition. (R. p. 105-112; 117-128.) A separate judgment was 
entered. (R. p. 131.) 
Petitioner timely appeals. (R. p. 133.) 
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ISSUE 
Whether the district court erred by summarily dismissing the petition for post 




The District Court Erred by Summarily Dismissing the Petition for Post Conviction 
Relief and/or It Erred by Dismissing It Without Appointing Counsel 
A. Standard of Review at Trial and on Appeal 
An application for post-conviction relief under Idaho Code § 19-4901 is 
civil in nature and is an entirely new proceeding distinct from the criminal action 
which led to the conviction. Nguyen v. State, 126 Idaho 494 (Ct.App. 1994). In 
order to prevail in a post-conviction proceeding, the applicant must prove, by a 
preponderance of the evidence, the allegations upon which the request for post-
conviction relief is based. Id. 
Summary disposition is the procedural equivalent of summary judgment 
under I.R.C.P. 56, with the facts construed and all reasonable inferences made in 
the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Gonzales v. State, 120 Idaho 
759 (Ct.App. 1991 ). Allegations contained in the verified petition are deemed 
true for the purpose of determining whether an evidentiary hearing should be 
held. Martinez v. State, 125 Idaho 844 (Ct.App. 1994). If the allegations do not 
frame a genuine issue of material fact, the court may grant a motion to summarily 
dismiss, but if the application raises material issues of fact, the district court must 
conduct an evidentiary hearing. Id. 
In determining whether a motion for summary disposition was properly 
granted, the appellate court reviews the facts in the light most favorable to 
petitioner and determines whether, if true, they would entitle petitioner to relief. 
Saykhamchone v. State, 127 Idaho 319 (1995). 
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B. Standard of Review Regarding a Claim of Ineffective Assistance of 
Counsel 
The standard for evaluating a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is 
well established, being set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 
(1984). The "benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be 
whether counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the 
adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just 
result." Id. at 686. 
Strickland set forth a two-prong test which a defendant must satisfy in 
order to be entitled to relief. The defendant must demonstrate both that his 
counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and 
that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the result of 
the proceedings would have been different. Id. at 687-88; State v. Charboneau, 
116 Idaho 129 (1989); Gibson v. State, 110 Idaho 631 (1986). 
C. Standard of Review Regarding a Claim of Ineffective Assistance of 
Appellate Counsel 
The standards regarding ineffective assistance of appellate counsel were 
detailed in Mintun v. State, 144 Idaho 656, 168 P.3d 40 (Ct.App. 2007): 
Mintun's claims that he was denied the effective assistance of 
counsel because appointed counsel should have raised certain 
additional issues on appeal are subject to the standards set forth in 
Strickland, and Mintun therefore must show that appellate counsel's 
performance was deficient and caused prejudice in the outcome of 
the appeal. An indigent defendant does not have a constitutional 
right to compel appointed appellate counsel to press all 
nonfrivolous arguments that the defendant wishes to pursue. 
Rather, the process of winnowing out weaker arguments on appeal 
and focusing on those more likely to prevail, far from being the 
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evidence of incompetence, is the hallmark of effective appellate 
advocacy. "Notwithstanding Barnes, it is still possible to bring a 
Strickland claim based on counsel's failure to raise a particular 
claim, but it is difficult to demonstrate that counsel was 
incompetent." "[O]nly when ignored issues are clearly stronger than 
those presented, will the presumption of effective assistance of 
counsel be overcome." 
Id., 168 P.3d at p. 45 (internal citations omitted). 
D. Standards for Appointing Counsel 
The standards for appointing counsel in a post conviction action were 
detailed in Charboneau v. State, 140 Idaho 789, 102 P.3d 1108 (2004): 
A request for appointment of counsel in a post conviction 
proceeding is governed by Idaho Code § 19-4904, which provides 
that in proceedings under the UPCPA, a court-appointed attorney 
"may be made available" to an applicant who is unable to pay the 
costs of representation. 
The decision to grant or deny a request for court-appointed counsel 
lies within the discretion of the district court. The Court of Appeals 
has ruled that when a district court is " ... presented with a request 
for appointed counsel, the court must address this request before 
ruling on the substantive issues in the case." This Court observed 
in Brown v. State, 135 Idaho 676, 23 P.3d 138 (2001) that 
As stated above, a needy applicant for post-conviction relief 
is entitled to court-appointed counsel unless the trial court 
determines that the post-conviction proceeding is frivolous. 
Idaho Code § 19-852(b)(3) sets forth the standard for 
determining whether or not a post-conviction proceeding is 
frivolous. It is frivolous if it is "not a proceeding that a 
reasonable person with adequate means would be willing to 
bring at his own expense." When applying that standard to 
pro se applications for appointment of counsel, the trial court 
should keep in mind that petitions and affidavits filed by a 
pro se petitioner will often be conclusory and incomplete. 
Although facts sufficient to state a claim may not be alleged 
because they do not exist, they also may not be alleged 
because the pro se petitioner simply does not know what are 
the essential elements of a claim. 
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It is essential that the petitioner be given adequate notice of 
the claimed defects so he has an opportunity to respond and 
to give the trial court an adequate basis for deciding the 
need for counsel based upon the merits of the claims. If the 
court decides that the claims in the petition are frivolous, the 
court should provide sufficient information regarding the 
basis for its ruling to enable the petitioner to supplement the 
request with the necessary additional facts, if they exist. 
Although the petitioner is not entitled to have counsel 
appointed in order to search the record for possible 
nonfrivolous claims, he should be provided with a meaningful 
opportunity to supplement the record and to renew his 
request for court-appointed counsel prior to the dismissal of 
his petition where, as here, he has alleged facts supporting 
some elements of a valid claim. 
135 Idaho at 679, 23 P.3d at 141. 
Here, the district judge should have first determined whether 
Charboneau was entitled to court-appointed counsel before 
denying the post-conviction relief on its merits. Based upon our 
decision in Quinlan v. Idaho Comm'n for Pardons and Parole, 138 
Idaho 726, 69 P.3d 146 (2003), it is clear that the standards 
imposed by I.C. § 19-852 are no longer applicable to the court's 
determination of entitlement to counsel in a post conviction 
proceeding. For the purposes of I.C. 19-4904, the trial court should 
determine if the petitioner is able to afford counsel and whether this 
is a situation in which counsel should be appointed to assist the 
petitioner. In doing that analysis, the trial court should keep in mind 
the admonition set forth in Brown about the typical problems with 
pro se pleadings. Therefore, in giving notice of intent to deny the 
Petition, "the court should provide sufficient information regarding 
the basis for its ruling to enable the petitioner to supplement the 
request with the necessary additional facts, if they exist." Id. If he 
alleges facts to raise the possibility of a valid claim, the district court 
should appoint counsel in order to give the petitioner an opportunity 
with counsel to properly allege the necessary supporting facts. 
Id., p. 792-793 (internal citations and footnote omitted). 
E. The Claims and the Court's Rulings 
The claims were explained by the district court in its Notice of Intent as 
follows: 
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The petitioner claims that appellate counsel was ineffective in his 
representation on appeal in failing to raise on appeal (1) that the 
evidence at trial was insufficient to sustain a conviction beyond a 
reasonable doubt; (2) that the trial court erred in failing to grant to 
[sic] defendant's motion for acquittal at the close of the State's 
case; (3) that the trial court erred in failing to grant the motion to 
suppress the out-of court identifications; and (4) that the trial court 
erred in granting the State's Motion to consolidate the trial of Mr. 
Ramirez and Mr. Digiallonardo. The petitioner does not allege that 
his trial counsel was ineffective in or prior to the trial or as to the 
issues raised in the Notice of Appeal. 
Notice of Intent, p. 8. (R. p. 90.) 
While Appellant asserts that the court should not have dismissed any 
claim without first appointing counsel, he directly challenges only the dismissal of 
the claim regarding the motion to suppress. As to it, the post conviction court 
explained: 
On May 23, 2008 petitioner's trial counsel filed a motion and 
memorandum in support of to [sic] suppress the alleged out-of court 
identification of the defendants by the victims. This motion was 
heard and argued on June 9, 2008. The decision of this motion was 
also a subject of the court's Memorandum Decision entered on 
June 12, 2008. (Memorandum Decision and Order Re: Plaintiff's 
Motions to Consolidate and Defendants' Motions to Suppress, 
entered June 12, 2008, pg. 10-11; 12-13). The transcript of this 
proceeding and the court's written decision were part of the record 
on appeal. 
This court in denying the motion to suppress identified the standard 
that applied as follows: 
In suppression hearings, "the power to assess the credibility of 
witnesses, resolve factual conflicts, weigh evidence, and draw 
factual inferences is vested in the trial court." State v. Conant, 143 
Idaho 797, 153 P.3d 477 (2007). 
The Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of due process ensures a 
criminal defendant's right to be free of impermissibly suggestive 
out-of-court identifications. 
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The defendant's right to due process is implicated when an 
in-court identification is tainted by an out-of-court 
identification that is so suggestive that there is a very 
substantial likelihood of misidentification. See State v. Bush, 
131 Idaho 22, 28, 951 P.2d 1249, 1255 (1997). So long as 
the identification possesses sufficient aspects of reliability, 
there is not a substantial likelihood of misidentification. Id. To 
determine the reliability of a suggestive identification, we 
evaluate the totality of the circumstances through 
consideration of five factors: (1) the opportunity of the 
witness to view the criminal at the time of the crime; (2) the 
witness's degree of attention; (3) the accuracy of his or her 
prior description of the criminal (4) the level of certainty 
demonstrated at the identification; and (5) the length of time 
between the crime and the identification. 
State v. Sanchez, 142 Idaho 309, 321, 127 P.2d 212,224 (Ct. App. 
2005). 
In applying the above stated standard this court stated in denying 
the motion to suppress, 
The defendants assert in substantially similar memorandums 
in support of their motions to suppress that an out-of-court 
identification of the suspects by the two witnesses was 
impermissibly suggestive and unreliable. For that reason, the 
defendants argue, the initial identifications should be 
suppressed as well as any in-court identifications. The State 
argues that the "identification" by Ms. Jones and Ms. Ceja 
was not an out-of-court identification for Due Process 
concerns but was rather a portion of the information 
gathering for the officers' investigation into probable cause. 
The facts of these two cases are strikingly similar to the facts 
in State v. Buti, 131 Idaho 793, 964 P.2d 660 (1998), except 
both Ms. Jones and Ms. Ceja admit that they never saw the 
faces of the two defendant's at the scene of the crime. In 
Buti the court upheld the admissibility of the identification of 
the defendant. In the present case both of the witnesses 
were positive that the vehicle that left the scene at Domino's 
was a silver 2-door silver Honda. They positively identified 
the defendant's vehicle at the scene of the stop in Twin Falls. 
The defendant's are not seeking to suppress the 
identification of the silver 2-door Honda. 
The preliminary hearing transcript shows that the two 
witnesses, Ms. Jones and Ms. Ceja, did not make any in-
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court identifications of the defendants as being the 
perpetrators of the crime at Domino's. Similarly, the 
testimony at the preliminary hearing also makes perfectly 
clear that at no time during the situation at Domino's did 
either Ms. Jones or Ms. Ceja observe the faces of either of 
the two suspects. The record has established that the 
witnesses informed the police that they observed the basic 
height, build, and clothing worn by the suspects during the 
incident at Domino's. Sergeant Baker asked Ms. Ceja and 
Ms. Jones to come to Twin Falls to see if the car, the 
clothing, and the individuals detained in Twin Falls matched 
the general physical description of the individuals seen in 
Jerome at Domino's. A reasonable inference to be drawn 
from Sergeant Baker's testimony is that the police knew that 
a true identification of either defendant as a perpetrator have 
been impossible, because the witnesses both acknowledged 
that they had never seen either suspect's face. Indeed, 
neither witness ever told the police "this is the person I saw 
at Domino's": rather, the witnesses noted similar 
characteristics between the suspects at Domino's and the 
defendants. The information relayed from the witnesses to 
the officers in Twin Falls was combined with other 
circumstantial evidence to form probable cause for arrest 
warrants seeking to arrest the defendants for the underlying 
robbery attempt. The "identification" by the witnesses was an 
acknowledgment of factual similarities, but it was not a 
positive out-of-court identification that either of the men 
shown outside police cars in Twin Falls participated in the 
activity at Domino's. The in-court identification of the 
defendants was an affirmation by the witnesses that the 
defendants were the same individuals they were shown in 
Twin Falls; it was not an affirmation that the defendants were 
the individuals seen in Jerome at Domino's. Because the 
witnesses' statements to the officers in Twin Falls 
acknowledging similarities between the individuals they 
observed at the time of the crime and the individuals they 
were shown in Twin Falls did not constitute an out-of-court 
identification, the defendants' due process rights are not 
implicated. As such, the defendants' motions to suppress 
shall be denied. 
The issues to be raised on appeal by appellate counsel are tactical 
or strategic decisions which are not to be second-guessed on post-
conviction unless those decisions are based on inadequate 
preparation, ignorance of relevant law or other shortcomings 
capable of objective evaluation. Id. The petitioner has failed to 
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present a triable issue of fact or a prima facie case that appellate 
counsel was either deficient or that he was prejudice in failing to 
raise on appeal the denial of the motion to suppress since there 
has been no showing by the petitioner that the trial court erred in its 
decision to deny the motion or that he would have prevailed on 
appeal if the issue had been raised. 
Notice of Intent, p. 12-13 (underlined emphasis added). (R. p. 94-95.) 
As mentioned above, the Petitioner did file a pro se reply to the Notice of 
Intent, which was summarized by the court as follows in its final Order dismissing 
Petition for post conviction relief (hereinafter Order): 
The petitioner in his Reply to the Notice of Intent to Dismiss, 
asserts that law enforcement made a "rush to judgment"; that the 
victims "were not very sure of the descriptions of the two individuals 
who went into the store"; that the testimony of the victims became 
more specific after the defendants were taken into custody; that law 
enforcement did not investigate other possibilities; that there were 
no masks or guns recovered; and that there was no direct evidence 
linking the defendants to the crime. 
Order, p. 6-7. (R. p. 122-123.) 
In its final order, the court stood by its original rulings in its Notice of Intent. 
As to the failure to appeal the denial of the suppression motion, the court stated 
in full: 
There is no dispute that prior to trial petitioner's trial counsel sought 
to suppress what they characterized by counsel as the victims' "out 
of court identification of the defendants". The victims never made 
what is commonly understood to be an "identification" of the 
defendant's. The victims only testified as to characteristics or 
similarities of the defendants as to their clothing, height, build, and 
skin color as well as the description of the car being driven by the 
suspects. The facts were similar to the facts in State v. Buti, 131 
Idaho 793, 964 P.2d 660 (1998). 
The testimony was clear that the victims could not identify the 
defendants by their faces. The petitioner has failed to demonstrate 
a prima facie claim that appellate counsel's failure to raise this 
issue on appeal was the result of "inadequate preparation, 
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ignorance of relevant law or other shortcomings capable of 
objective evaluation." Baxter v. State, supra. There is no showing 
that appellate counsel could have made a valid argument that the 
trial court erred in denying the motion to suppress or that the 
petitioner would have prevailed on appeal. Therefore, this claim 
should be dismissed. 
Order, p. 9. (R. p. 125.) 
F. The Court Erred in Summarily Denying the Petition and Without 
Appointing Counsel 
Petitioner asserts that the district court erred in summarily denying the 
petition for post conviction relief and/or in summarily denying it without first 
appointing counsel. This is because the court denied the post conviction claim 
(and counsel) by just carrying on its flawed conclusion from its memorandum 
decision in the criminal case denying the motion to suppress. Since the court 
was wrong in denying the motion to suppress, it was likewise wrong in denying 
the claim that appellate counsel was ineffective by failing to appeal that 
erroneous decision. 
In its Notice of Intent, the post conviction court provides in full its analysis 
from its Memorandum Decision and Order Re: Plaintiff's Motions to Consolidate 
and Defendants' Motions to Suppress (hereinafter Decision Denying 
Suppression). It repeatedly states that there was no identification, but rather the 
witnesses merely acknowledged similar characteristics shared by the two men in 
the show up and the two men at the Domino's store. This is not correct, 
however, and does not even follow the court's own recitation of the evidence of 
those witnesses from the preliminary hearing which the court sets forth in the 
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same Decision Denying Suppression. 1 
As to the first witness, Carol Jones, the court's Decision Denying 
Suppression sets forth the relevant part of her preliminary hearing testimony as 
follows: 
Upon arriving at the scene in Twin Falls, Ms. Jones immediately 
recognized the silver Honda as the same car from the crime. Ms. 
Jones testified that she recognized the two men by their size and 
shaved heads. The police took one man out of a car, and Ms. 
Jones recognized him as similar but thought the man had a darker 
skin tone. Ms. Jones testified that the second man the officers 
showed her after taking him out of a different car was wearing 
different clothes from those that were worn during the crime. She 
testified that it was mainly the shaved head and the temple part of 
the skin that made her believe it was one of the men from earlier. 
When an officer brought a gray baggy sweatshirt out of the silver 
Honda stopped in Twin Falls, Ms. Jones testified that she believed 
it was the same gray sweatshirt worn by the second man to enter 
the business during the crime-that is, the man that pointed what 
she thought was a rifle at her. During Ms. Jones' testimony the 
defendant Digiallonardo was identified as the first person to be 
shown to Ms. Jones in Twin Falls. The defendant Ramirez was 
identified during Ms. Jones' testimony as the second man who was 
shown to Ms. Jones for identification in Twin Falls. 
Decision Denying Suppression, p. 5. (R. 35761, p. 54.) 
As to the second witness, Jamie Ceja, the court described her testimony 
as follows: 
The second man the police showed Ms. Ceja and Ms. Jones was 
wearing, according to Ms. Ceja, a tank top and baggy pants. Ms. 
Ceja testified that the second man taken out of a car in Twin Falls 
"was wearing a tank top, and he looked - yeah, he looked like it 
also, the height and everything. And then at the car they took the 
gray hoodie out and that just really - it - I believe that that was -
that was him." Ms. Ceja identified defendant Ramirez as the second 
man shown to Ms. Ceja in Twin Falls. Ms. Ceja testified that she 
only saw the clothes and the height of the criminals and based her 
1 The post conviction court took judicial notice of this decision and Appellant is 
requesting this Court do so also in a contemporaneously filed motion. 
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identification off of that, because she didn't see faces in Jerome, 
just the clothes and the heights of the men. 
Decision Denying Suppression, p. 6 (emphasis added). (R. 35761, p. 55.) 
The court later described the police officer's testimony at the suppression 
hearing who testified regarding the show up procedure. He testified that the 
witnesses were brought to the suspects' vehicle which was shown in lights, and 
the witnesses then looked at the suspects who were handcuffed and placed in 
spot lights, and the witnesses were together when they made their identifications. 
(R. 35761, p. 58.) 
Clearly, the court is just wrong when it claims that the witnesses are not 
identifying the two men in the show up as the two men who committed the crime. 
It appears that the court is laboring under a misconception that an identification 
must include facial recognition. Obviously, facial recognition is not necessary in 
all cases, the most obviously one being a tattoo identification. Here, where 
witness(es) say that it is the same car, that they are the same clothes, that the 
men are the same height, and that they have the same shaved head, that is an 
identification. The lack of facial recognition merely goes to· its weight and does 
not mean it was not an identification in the first place. 
The same is true as to the witnesses' use of the word "believe." Assuming 
arguendo that it is actually a qualifier, it also just goes to weight and the degree 
of certainty of the identification, there is no requirement that an identification be 
100% certain in order to be an identification. 
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Back to the testimony, even ignoring Carol Jones' identification as the 
weaker of the two, Jamie Ceja's identification expressly said "that was him." That 
is an identification, and the court was wrong when it held it was not. 
Since the court was wrong about whether it was an identification, it was 
also wrong when it failed to analyze it as such. Without belaboring it since no 
analysis was done, the court describes multiple self evident problems in the show 
up that establishes it was overly suggestive, including the fact that it was not a 
lineup, the suspects were in handcuffs and spot lighted, and the witnesses were 
together when making their identifications. Since the show up was overly 
suggestive, the court should have gone on to analyze the likelihood of 
misidentification, which based on the factors the court itself set forth, is high. 
The criminal court's error in mischaracterizing what happened as not an 
identification and the court's resultant failure to analyze the 
suggestiveness/misidentification issue provided a valid appellate issue for direct 
appeal. Of course, appointed appellate counsel failed to raise this issue. Given 
all this, Appellant asserts that the court erred in summarily dismissing this claim 
without an evidentiary hearing. 
Alternatively, the court should have appointed counsel. As shown above, 
the ineffective assistance of appellate counsel for failure to raise the suppression 
issue is not nearly as clear cut as the post conviction court believes. Counsel 
should have been appointed to assist the Petitioner in developing this claim (and 
perhaps others) and the court erred when it failed to appoint counsel. 
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CONCLUSION 
Wherefore, for the reasons as stated above, Appellant/Petitioner 
respectfully requests that the district court's order summarily dismissing his 
petition for post conviction relief be reversed and vacated and that the petition for 
post conviction relief be remanded to the district court for an evidentiary hearing 
and/or that counsel be a~inted. 
DATED this [.0:_ day of November, 2013. 
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